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Extraterritorial Discovery: Extension of
Jurisdiction by the Eleventh Circuit
By GEOFFREY SPELLBERG
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCTON
The industrial and technological revolutions have forced nations to
abandon any previous isolationist propensities and to accept responsibili-
ties commensurate with their respective positions in the international
community. The concomitant disintegration of historical, geographic
and cultural barriers has spawned increased interaction between nations
and an associated increase in international conflict.'
Among the various types of disagreements that have arisen, one fre-
quent problem concerns assertion of jurisdiction by a court over a person
or res located within a foreign state. The early United States judiciary
emphatically concluded that this extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction
was contrary to the law of nations.2 This concern eroded quickly, how-
ever, as the judiciary began to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals
involved in activities abroad which affected United States interests. 3 This
attitude shift was particularly evident during Prohibition when foreign
citizens conspired to smuggle liquor into the United States. The judici-
1. Early in its history the United States was involved in a disagreement with a foreign
power resulting from commerce between the two nations. A United States vessel captured by
France during peacetime sailed into Philadelphia two years later as a French warship. The
original owners brought suit to recover the vessel, but the Supreme Court, in deference to
French sovereignty, refused to assert jurisdiction. See Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2. Id. at 136. Justice Marshall stated:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
Id. See also The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation can
justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens.")
3. This basis for asserting jurisdiction is called the "effects doctrine," which allows states
to prohibit acts or omissions occurring outside its territory if the conduct has effects within its
territory. See Mancuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in US: Trade Law: The Need
for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLOM. J. TRANs. L. 439 (1981).
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ary did not hesitate to assert jurisdiction over these foreign nationals. 4
Under the Sherman Act,5 the courts considerably expanded their
jurisdiction over foreign entities. Sometimes the cartels and monopolies
found in violation of the antitrust laws included foreign enterprises. 6 In
an early antitrust case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,7
Judge Hand summed up the extension of jurisdiction: "[I]t is settled law
.. . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize."'
Extension of jurisdiction by United States courts to foreign enter-
prises has typically been manifested by discovery orders compelling doc-
ument production. In a recent decision, one court noted: "With the
growing interdependence of world trade and the increased mobility of
persons and companies, the need arises not infrequently, whether related
to civil or criminal proceedings, for the production of evidence located in
foreign jurisdictions."9 In these situations, the courts have generally not
utilized letters rogatory,1° but simply conducted the discovery under
Rules 26, 34 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 The judi-
ciary recognized, however, that treating evidence and individuals located
abroad solely under the Federal Rules was an unacceptable encroach-
ment on the sovereignty of other nations. 12 This concern is particularly
compelling where a national statute specifically prohibits discovery of
materials by a foreign tribunal.13 Consequently, the American courts
4. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1926).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
6. See, eg., In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d
992 (10th Cir. 1977).
7. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. Id. at 443.
9. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968).
10. "Letters rogatory are formal communications from a court in which an action is pend-
ing to a foreign court requesting that the testimony of a witness residing in such foreign juris-
diction be taken under the direction of the court addressed and transmitted to the court
making the request." Gins, LAW DICTIONARY (1975). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b), 32(b).
The use of letters rogatory has been expanded to other discovery devices, including requests
for documents. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2083,
2143 (1970).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 34, 37. Rule 26 sets out the general provisions governing discov-
ery. Rule 34 governs document production, while Rule 37 lists the sanctions available to the
court when the party in question fails to comply with the discovery order.
12. As discussed infra, the United States judiciary has developed an extraterritorial dis-
covery analysis which accords considerable respect to foreign sovereignty.
13. These specific antidiscovery laws are called nondisclosure or blocking statutes.
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developed an analysis whereby the equities involved are evaluated when
an extraterritorial discovery request from a United States tribunal con-
travenes a foreign law.
This Note will examine this analysis and the associated procedures
employed by United States courts to determine the propriety of discovery
orders that subject a party to liability under a foreign nondisclosure stat-
ute. The discussion will focus on discovery orders imposed upon third
parties involved in the litigation only as impartial custodians of records.
These neutral parties 4 have usually been accorded considerable defer-
ence in these situations by virtue of their noninvolvement. In a recent
Eleventh Circuit decision1 5 involving third party extraterritorial discov-
ery subject to a nondisclosure statute, however, the court significantly
expanded United States jurisdiction over the neutral party in derogation
of the foreign statute. This decision will be compared with a more recent
decision16 in which the Seventh Circuit expressed concern with the neu-
trality of the party subject to the discovery order and discussed whether
imposition of sanctions was appropriate where compliance with the order
would violate foreign law. Finally, the ramifications and potential
problems of the extension of jurisdiction by the Eleventh Circuit will be
addressed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL POLICY
RE: EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY AND
FOREIGN NONDISCLOSURE LAWS
As the United States judiciary exhibited greater willingness to order
extraterritorial discovery and to impose sanctions for noncompliance, a
concomitant increase in foreign protests occurred. 7 In one instance, the
French, Dutch, English and Italian governments ordered oil companies
within their respective jurisdictions not to comply with subpoenas issued
by a United States District Court. 8 In response, the United States De-
14. This is a term used by the courts to describe these disinterested record holders.
15. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983).
16. United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
17. Numerous delegates at the 51st Conference of the International Law Association
strongly criticized the United States judiciary for its willingness in prior instances to exces-
sively expand its jurisdiction in derogation of foreign sovereignty. INTERNATIONAL LAW As-
SOCIATION, REPORT OF 51sT CONFERENCE 565 (Tokyo 1965).
18. See In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, 1952-53 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,358
at 67,897 (Nov. 10, 1952).
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partment of Justice moved to vacate the subpoenas.19 More frequently
these remonstrations have culminated in the enactment of statutes specif-
ically designed to prevent discovery by United States courts of docu-
ments held by entities within the jurisdiction of the particular sovereign
promulgating the legislation.20
In addition to these statutes specifically designed to defeat foreign
discovery, a number of nations have enacted statutes designed to main-
tain the confidentiality of their financial institutions. 21  The purpose of
these nondisclosure laws is to attract foreign investors by assuring dis-
creet financial services. Although the underlying reason for this type of
statute is different than the "blocking" statute discussed above, both
types function similarly by prohibiting disclosure of certain information
under threat of legal sanction. Consequently, a single analysis is em-
ployed by the United States judiciary in evaluating extraterritorial dis-
covery conflicts.22
The methodology used is a two-part test which enables a court to
evaluate the necessity of enforcing an extraterritorial discovery order
when compliance would subject the responding party to liability under a
foreign nondisclosure law.
A. The Societe Internationale Analysis
The sole United States Supreme Court decision addressing this issue
is Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers.23 In this action, a Swiss plaintiff brought suit to
recover assets seized during World War II by the United States Govern-
ment under the Trading With the Enemy Act.24 During discovery, the
Government moved for an order25 requiring the plaintiff to produce a
large number of banking documents.26 Plaintiff refused to comply with
19. 1952-53 Trade Cas. (CCH) 5 67,480 (Apr. 28, 1953).
20. For discussion of the history and practical effect of these foreign "blocking" statutes,
see Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from
Non-Resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61 (1981).
21. See, eg., UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND, FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO BANKS
AND SAVINGS BANKS 21 (1972).
22. The purpose for which the nondisclosure statute in question was enacted can become
important under Factor (b) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OP
THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
23. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
24. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
25. The government's motion for production of documents was made under Rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
26. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 199-200.
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the court order and subsequently made several motions requesting that it
be relieved of production on the ground that disclosure of this material
would violate Swiss penal laws. The district court appointed a Special
Master to examine plaintiff's actions and the nature of the Swiss laws in
question.27 Even though the Master found that plaintiff sustained its
burden of a good faith attempt to comply with the discovery order, the
district court dismissed the complaint.28
The Supreme Court reversed this decision and noted that plaintiff's
"failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due
to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by circumstances
within its control."29 Accordingly, since a good faith attempt at compli-
ance was evident, the district court was held to have improperly exer-
cised its authority under Rule 37(b) 30 by dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff met this good faith requirement by 1) showing that there was no
collusion between itself and the Swiss Government to prevent production
and 2) attempting to secure waivers of the Swiss law.31 Absent these
efforts, the Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiff would have failed
to meet the good faith requirement and would thus have been subject to
sanctions under Rule 37.32
In essence, the Supreme Court mandated that a party faced with
potentially conflicting adjudications resulting from a United States dis-
covery order contrary to a foreign law must demonstrate a good faith
attempt to resolve the conflict. Without an adequate demonstration, the
party cannot refuse compliance and still avoid judicial sanctions. Since
the Societe Internationale decision, judicial analysis of extraterritorial
discovery conflicts has, with few exceptions, focused on the good faith
attempts at compliance made by the party.3
B. The Restatement Balancing Test
In addition to the good faith requirement, judicial determinations of
this question have relied to a significant extent on the balancing test of
27. Id. at 200-01.
28. Id. at 201. Dismissal of the complaint is a proper sanction under FED. R. Civ. P.
37(b).
29. Id. at 211.
30. See supra note 28.
31. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 201-2. Through plaintiff's efforts, a number of the
documents in question were released.
32. Id.
33. For a discussion of the good faith requirement and how it has been used by the courts,
see Note, Extraterritorial Discovery; An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 CoLum. L REv.
1320 (1983).
19841
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.34 The elements of this
test considered most important by the judiciary are (1) the qualitative
comparison of the vital national interest of each state as reflected in its
respective statute; and (2) the nature and extent of the hardship imposed
on the individual by the inconsistent actions of each law.35
These primary considerations, along with the other Restatement
factors, are coupled with the Societe Internationale good faith require-
ment to form the essential extraterritorial discovery analysis utilized by
the United States judiciary. This two-part test is used to resolve conflicts
arising from United States discovery orders impinging on foreign non-
disclosure statutes. This analysis is used not only when a party is actu-
ally facing contrary adjudications, but also to determine potential extra-
territorial conflicts if the discovery order is issued.36
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 39, 40 (1965) state as
follows:
§ 39. Inconsistent Requirements Do Not Affect Jurisdiction.
(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not pre-
cluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person
to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.
(2) Factors to be considered in minimizing conflicts arising from the application of
the rule stated in Sub-Section (1) with respect to enforcement jurisdiction are stated
in Section 40.
§ 40. Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction.
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the party of a person each state
is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states.
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person.
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
These sections are soon to be superseded by §§ 403, 419-420 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (tentative draft No. 3).
35. Id.
36. When the analysis is used to determine the propriety of issuing an order, the factors
are construed less favorably for the potential recipient than in the situation where the party has
already received the order. The consequences of mistakenly issuing a discovery order are less
severe than mistakenly imposing sanctions on a party refusing compliance. Improper issuance
of an order will force the recipient to attempt production and, at worst, return to court and
seek a modification. Conversely, a party facing sanctions could have his lawsuit dismissed, or
be fined. Further, even if the situation appears to militate against issuance, actual issuance
may stimulate the recipient party to achieve an equitable solution for all concerned. Conse-
quently, courts in this situation have invariably issued the discovery order. See, e.g., SEC v.
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C. Application of the Societe Internationale-Restatement Analysis
The United States judiciary has developed a methodology in evalu-
ating extraterritorial discovery cases which is a hybrid of the Restate-
ment test and the Societe Internationale decision. Almost all courts
handling this legal problem have utilized this two-part test. The three
following decisions represent typical applications of this analysis.
1. United States v. Vetco, Inc.37
Vetco, Inc. (Vetco), an American corporation, and its wholly owned
Swiss subsidiary were served with Internal Revenue summonses request-
ing, among other items, books and records physically located in Switzer-
land. 8 Vetco resisted the summonses on the ground that compliance
would subject it to sanction under the Swiss penal code.3 9 The district
court then attempted to enforce the summonses. Upon Vetco's further
refusal to comply, the district court held the corporation in contempt.'
The Ninth Circuit in affirming the decision noted Vetco's efforts to
comply with the summons had failed to meet the Societe Internationale
good faith standard.4 Continuing with its analysis, the court balanced
the competing national interests using the Restatement test. The United
States concern for collecting taxes and prosecuting tax fraud was
weighed against the Swiss interest in preserving the secrecy of its banking
records. In its evaluation, the court noted that the company possessing
the records was a subsidiary of an American corporation and the inter-
ests protected by the banking secrecy statute were primarily those of
Swiss domiciliaries.42 Consequently, Vetco's interest as a nondomiciliary
was only secondarily protected. In addition, the secrecy statute provided
for disclosure upon consent of the party.43 Finally, the court held that
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.RD. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976); Ghana Supply Comm. v. New England Power Co.,
83 F.ILD. 586, 594 (1979).
37. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098
(1981).
38. Id. at 1326.
39. Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code provides in pertinent part:
Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign gov-
erninental agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise or to an agent of any
of them shall be subject to imprisonment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a
penitentiary.
644 F.2d at 1329. The imprisonment may be combined with a fine. Id.
40. Id. at 1326.
41. Id. at 1330.
42. Id. at 1331.
43. Id.
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since the Internal Revenue Service was required by law to keep the infor-
mation confidential, the Swiss concern about releasing the information
was correspondingly decreased.' After weighing these factors, the court
concluded that the Swiss interest was inferior to that of the United
States.
The court next examined the facts under the Restatement hardship
element." It concluded that the hardship (i.e., criminal sanctions) im-
posed upon Vetco as a result of production was avoidable since Swiss law
provided the defense of duress for the criminal violation of disclosure.46
Thus, Vetco could have pleaded this affirmative defense and avoided cul-
pability under the Swiss penal code. Even without asserting this defense,
it is unlikely that the corporation would have been subject to prosecu-
tion. In previous cases, the Swiss Government had declined to prosecute
individuals who had complied with United States Internal Revenue sum-
monses and concurrently violated Swiss banking secrecy regulations. 47
Finally, had Vetco kept copies of the records at its domestic offices as
required by law, the entire issue would have been moot. In short, Vetco
brought the hardship upon itself.
In balancing all the factors discussed above, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that Vetco could not refuse to comply with the summonses and
consequently the contempt order issued by the lower court was
affirmed.48
2. In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts
Litigation49
In this breach of contract action50 Westinghouse alleged that a
worldwide cartel, in violation of United States antitrust laws, had
manipulated uranium prices which thereby made performance by West-
inghouse on its contracts commercially impracticable.5 As part of its
attempt to prove the existence of the international cartel, Westinghouse
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1332.
47. Id.
48. For a more thorough analysis of this case, see Parsius, Resolving Conflicts With For-
eign Non-Disclosure Laws: An Analysis of the Vetco Case, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. 13 (1983).
49. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th
Cir. 1977).
50. Westinghouse had contracted with numerous United States utility companies to dc-
liver uranium at certain prices. When the price at which Westinghouse purchased the uranium
increased 800%, it refused to perform on the contracts claiming commercial impracticability.
Id. at 994.
51. For a discussion of United States impingement upon Canadian sovereignty in general,
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filed suit against Rio Algon, a Delaware corporation, whose corporate
office was located in Canada. Westinghouse subsequently sent document
production requests to Rio Algon seeking corporate records located in
Canada. When Rio Algon refused to comply, arguing that compliance
would subject it to Canadian criminal sanctions,5 2 the district court held
it in contempt.53
This decision was reversed by the Tenth Circuit which noted that
Rio Algon had made diligent efforts to produce the materials including
seeking a waiver from the Canadian authorities.54  Further, nothing in
the record indicated that Rio Algon had "run" to Canada to protect it-
self from American discovery or colluded with the government in the
promulgation of the nondisclosure statute.55 Thus, Rio Algon had met
the Societe Internationale good faith standard.
The court continued its evaluation using a truncated version of the
Restatement test. The United States concern with affording adequate
discovery to litigants in federal court was balanced against the Canadian
interest in controlling and supervising the atomic energy industry. This
interest was deemed particularly compelling as the Ontario Supreme
Court had previously refused to enforce letters rogatory issued for pro-
duction of the same material.56 The Court ruled that enforcement of the
letters would be contrary to Canadian national interests. 7 This decision
was taken as evidence that the Canadian concern of controlling its
atomic energy industry was superior to the more generalized United
States concern.
The court, almost in passing, touched upon the Restatement hard-
ship factor. It noted that the Canadian documents were not essential to
Westinghouse in order to prove its allegation of a worldwide cartel.58
and in this case in particular, see Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Fiends: Canada and the
United States in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 165, 187 (1978).
52. Rio Algon claimed that it would be in violation of the Canadian Uranium Information
Security Regulations, CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS. 76-674 (P.C. 1976 2368, Sept. 31, 1976),
promulgated under the authority of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. REv. STAT.
1970 c. A-19. This statute was specifically promulgated in response to United States investiga-
tions into the alleged worldwide uranium cartel and is a typical "blocking" statute. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
53. Apparently the district court did not utilize the two-part extraterritorial analysis. It
held Rio Algon in contempt without fully examining all the available evidence. Westinghouse,
563 F.2d at 995.
54. Id. at 998.
55. Id.
56. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, 16 Ont. 2d 273
(1977).
57. Id. See also Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 995.
58. Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 999.
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Consequently, the hardship imposed on Rio Algon by demanding pro-
duction (i.e., subjection to criminal sanction) was deemed greater than
forcing Westinghouse to pursue the information in question from other
sources. Therefore, the hardship factor was construed in favor of Rio
Algon.
The court, mostly on the strength of the prevailing Canadian na-
tional interest, ruled that Rio Algon was not subject to the discovery
request. 9 Accordingly, the contempt order was vacated.'
3. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana61
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action
against a Swiss banking corporation for violating inside trading prohibi-
tions. The SEC attempted, as part of the suit, to obtain the identities of
the individuals involved in the scheme.62 The corporation refused to sup-
ply the information, claiming that disclosure would violate Swiss banking
secrecy law.63 Consecuently the SEC moved for a court order compel-
ling disclosure of the information. The court ruled against the Swiss cor-
poration, stating that it had made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure
laws to shield its illegal activities in United States financial markets.
Such action was deemed to fall below the Societe Internationale good
faith standard.64
The court also examined the matter under the Restatement test.
The United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the
integrity of its financial markets was balanced against Swiss concern for
the privacy of its banking customers. 65 The court considered it signifi-
cant that the Swiss Government had not intervened and protested the
discovery request. This lack of action was construed as indicative that
the Swiss interest was inferior.66
The court then examined hardship considerations. It noted that
Swiss law provided some flexibility as any bank faced with a disclosure
59. Id.
60. It should be noted that the analysis employed in this case is similar to that used in
Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324, even though the nondisclosure statute was specifically promulgated to
prevent the exact type of discovery sought by Westinghouse. The fact that the statute was
enacted in response to extensive United States extraterritorial discovery was construed as evi-
dence of a strong national interest in controlling the Canadian atomic energy program, See
Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 998. See generally Batista, supra note 20.
61. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
62. Id. at 117.
63. Id. at 117-118.
64. Id. at 117.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1,17-18.
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order could obtain waivers from its customers and thus avoid Swiss pros-
ecution.67 Further, the Swiss penal code provided the affirmative defense
of necessity which would relieve the disclosing party of liability when
acting to protect itself.68 It was found, however, that the banking corpo-
ration had deliberately refused to avail itself of these exceptions. Conse-
quently, any hardship in complying would be a result of the
corporation's own bad faith actions. Since the corporation intentionally
courted these impediments, the court accorded little concern to the po-
tential hardship. 69
Given that the Swiss corporation displayed bad faith by attempting
to shield its nefarious activities under Swiss law, the district court or-
dered the corporation to disclose the requested information to the SEC.70
Since the only issue was the court order, as opposed to imposition of
sanctions for noncompliance, the Swiss corporation had a heavy burden
to establish a potential extraterritorial conflict.71
4. Commonality of the Three Decisions
These three decisions are indicative of the manner in which the
American judiciary handles cases involving extraterritorial discovery or-
ders that violate foreign statutes. The good faith requirement articulated
in Societe Internationale must be met by the party refusing disclosure. A
balancing test is then employed primarily to consider conflicting state
interests and the measure of hardship inflicted upon the party complying
with the discovery order. All of these factors are weighed by the court.
Depending on how the balance tips, a party will face judicial sanction for
refusing to comply with an extraterritorial discovery order, or it will be
relieved of the production obligation. Ultimately, in determining
whether a discovery order should issue, the analysis is identical except
that the burden on the party contesting the order becomes heavier.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY OF THIRD
PARTY MATERIALS
In most instances parties facing extraterritorial discovery requests
have been either litigants or under investigation by an official body.' A
neutral third party possessing pertinent documents is, however, occasion-
67. Id. at 118.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 119.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 36.
72. !-g., a party under investigation by a grand jury or the Internal Revenue Service.
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ally maneuvered into a position where compliance with a discovery order
will invite foreign liability, while a refusal to do so will subject the party
to sanctions under Rule 37.73 In these instances, the courts have utilized
the previously discussed two-part analysis, but have accorded weight to
the additional factor of the party's neutrality when determining whether
to enforce the discovery order.
Until 1982 there had been four significant cases involving extraterri-
torial discovery of third party materials. All four decisions were in the
Second Circuit. The court in each case utilized the essential elements of
the Societe Internationale-Restatement test.74 The neutral posture of
each third party was, however, a determinative factor in the respective
analyses.
A. The Four Cases
The facts of the cases, First National City Bank of New York v. Inter-
nal Revenue Service,75 Ings v. Ferguson,7 6 Application of Chase Manhat-
tan Bank,77 and United States v. First National City Bank,78 were similar.
In each instance, the third party to the litigation was a bank. Each bank
was in possession of documents relevant to the lawsuit and the docu-
ments were in a foreign branch office. The respective banks declined to
comply with discovery requests, arguing that production would subject
them to liability under foreign nondisclosure statutes. In the analysis of
each action, the Second Circuit explicitly or implicitly recognized the
tenuous equities associated with subjecting a neutral party to penalties
resulting from inconsistent adjudications.
B. Second Circuit Analysis
The party seeking production of bank documents in Ings v. Ferguson
had rejected the possibility of seeking the documents in question through
the use of letters rogatory. 9 Instead, the party sought to have the court
enforce a subpoena against the bank.8" The circuit court refused to ex-
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 lists the sanctions which a court may impose upon a party that
refuses to comply with a discovery order. See supra note 11.
74. le., good faith attempt at production, balancing of respective national interests and
amount of hardship imposed on the producing party.
75. First National City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
76. Ings. v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
77. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
78. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
79. See Banca, 92 F.R.D. at 114.
80. Id. at,150-51.
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tend its jurisdiction to impinge upon the sovereignty of the foreign coun-
try in question (Canada). It stated:
Every reason exists for careful scrutiny here. No claim is being
made against [the] bank by any litigant. ... It seems highly undesir-
able that the courts of the United States should countenance service of
a subpoena upon a New York agency of a foreign bank which is not a
party to the litigation and whose country has provided procedures for
securing information, the production of which is consistent with its
laws.81
Evidently, had the subpoena been issued to the bank as a litigant with an
interest in the matter, the court would have displayed less sympathy.
The court held that compliance with the subpoena would contradict
the principle of international comity82 by forcing a violation of Canadian
laws or at least a circumvention of that country's procedures. 3 Accord-
ingly, the subpoena was restricted to the bank records already within the
United States." This concern with impinging upon Canadian sover-
eignty was clearly enhanced by the neutral posture of the Canadian bank.
Similarly, in Application of Chase Manhattan Rank,85 the Second
Circuit upheld the lower court ruling that a subpoena duces tecum
should be modified if compliance would necessitate a violation of foreign
law. In this instance, Chase Manhattan (the neutral third party) would
have been liable for a fine of approximately one hundred dollars if it had
complied with the subpoena. As in Ings86 and First National City Bank
of New York v. IRS,"7 the court refused to enforce the subpoena when
compliance would result in even an insignificant violation of foreign law.
The court noted that while a litigant has a "real interest. . . in obtaining
evidence wherever located. . .[there is] an obligation to respect the laws
81. Id. at 152.
82. Comity was defined by a later court as "a nation's expression of understanding which
demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of per-
sons protected by its own laws." Somportex, Ltd., v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453
F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
83. See Ings, 282 F.2d at 152. The Court stated:
Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the
enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may cause a violation of the
laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its
procedures.
Id.
84. Id. at 153.
85. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611.
86. Ings, 282 F.2d 149.
87. First National, 271 F.2d at 619.
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of other sovereign states .... ,"88
In United States v. First National City Bank,89 the court upheld a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum for documents kept at a branch office
in Germany. Since the bank faced only the possibility of civil liability for
violation of the German bank secrecy laws, and it admitted that those
consequences were minimal, the subpoena was allowed to issue.90 Had
compliance subjected the bank to criminal sanctions, however, it is likely
that the circuit court would have quashed or modified the subpoena. 91
The Second Circuit in each of these four cases evinced considerable
reluctance to extend jurisdiction to discovery of third party extraterrito-
rial material. In each case, concern with forcing the uninvolved third
party to violate a foreign law was the primary concern. Even in United
States v. First National City Bank,92 the court probably would not have
issued the subpoena if the defendant had obtained a restraining order
which would have subjected the bank to criminal sanctions for compli-
ance with the subpoena.93 In similar adjudications involving litigants
subject to discovery orders, the United States judiciary has rarely hesi-
tated to assert control over discovery materials beyond its territorial
reach. The decisions favoring the third party's right to refuse compliance
in Ings, Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank of New York
were influenced to a large extent by the neutral posture of the banks. A
later court discussing extraterritorial jurisdiction noted that these three
decisions "appear to view foreign law prohibitions as an absolute bar to
ordering production, ' '94 but that they "dealt with a non-party witness
and that factor may have been the one distinguishing these cases from
88. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613.
89. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897.
90. Id.
91. "[lit is surely of considerable significance that Germany considers bank secrecy sim-
ply a privilege that can be waived by the customer and is content to leave the matter of en-
forcement to the vagaries of private litigation." Id. at 903.
92. Id.
93. The court stated:
... [I]t was a simple matter for a bank customer to obtain an ex parte re-
straining order enjoining a bank from disclosing privileged material and that viola-
tion of such an injunction would be punished under a general provision of the
criminal law governing violation of court orders. The trial judge then adjourned the
hearing to determine whether defendant in fact planned to do this,
"[A] violation of bank secrecy could subject the bank to liability in contract
or tort but not to criminal sanctions or their equivalent."
Id. at 899.
94. Banca, 92 F.R.D. at 114.
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[others]." 95
It is also noteworthy that each case involved a motion to modify
either a subpoena duces tecum or an IRS summons. Essentially, the
court in each instance determined whether a discovery order should be
issued. Since the consequences of incorrectly issuing a discovery order
are minimal (compared with a contempt charge if the banks had simply
refused compliance), 96 the judicial reluctance to extend jurisdiction is
even more significant.97
In summary, when the burden of extraterritorial discovery had pre-
viously fallen on a neutral party, the only circuit which had dealt with
the situation carefully scrutinized the circumstances of the action. It was
recognized that an inherent unfairness existed in subjecting a party to
liability when that party's involvement in the litigation was merely fortu-
itous (i.e., the chance holder of documents). This concern with fairness
to the nonlitigant party was evident in the four previously discussed
cases. 98 The resulting decisions are indicative of the impact that the neu-
tral posture of each bank had in the respective litigations.
IV. EXTENSION OF DISCOVERY JURISDICTION
OVER THIRD PARTIES
Despite the Second Circuit precedent, in a recent Eleventh Circuit
case99 involving third party extraterritorial discovery subject to a nondis-
closure statute, the court significantly expanded United States jurisdic-
tion over the neutral party in derogation of the foreign statute. The
analysis employed in this case completely discounted the third party's
posture vis-i.-vis the litigation. In a factually similar case decided several
months later, the Seventh Circuit"co incorporated the disinterested pos-
ture of the uninvolved party into its evaluation of the equities involved in
imposing sanctions for noncompliance with a discovery order. This
treatment of the situation evinces a recognition of the doctrine of interna-
tional comity"' l that is lacking in the earlier decisions.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 36 and FED. K. Civ. P. 37.
97. When the extraterritorial discovery analysis is employed in the initial determination
whether the discovery order should issue, the balance is heavily weighted to issuing the order.
See supra note 36.
98. See text accompanying notes 74-97.
99. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. CL 3086 (1983).
100. United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
101. See Somportex, Ltd., v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
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A. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia102
In this case a federal grand jury conducting a tax and narcotics in-
vestigation issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Miami branch of the
Bank of Nova Scotia. 10 3 The grand jury sought production of records
kept at the bank's Nassau branch."° The records related to the accounts
of a bank customer under criminal investigation. When the bank refused
to comply with the subpoena, asserting that compliance would violate
Bahamian bank secrecy laws,'05 the district court held it in contempt.
The bank argued that imposition of the contempt sanctions for non-
disclosure would be a violation of due process because the bank lacked
"purposeful involvement or responsibility in the subject matter before the
court." Essentially, the bank claimed it was fundamentally unfair to re-
quire a "mere stakeholder" to comply with a subpoena and thereby incur
criminal sanctions. 0 6 The court was unimpressed with this argument. It
held that since the bank maintained branches within the United States
there were sufficient grounds to subject the bank to jurisdiction. 0 7
The bank further contended that the Restatement test as adopted by
the Eleventh Circuit in a previous decision was inappropriately applied
since it was a neutral party. For support, the bank noted that in an ear-
lier case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field,"8 the bank
subject to the discovery order was itself under investigation by the grand
jury. The bank attempted to distinguish that case since the Field bank
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972), for the definition of international comity frequently
cited by American courts.
102. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
103. The Bank of Nova Scotia is a Canadian chartered bank with branches and agencies in
forty-five countries. Id. at 1386.
104. Id.
105. Bah. Acts No. 64, as amended by the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation
Amendment Act, 1980. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1386 n.2 for the applicable
sections.
106. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1388.
107. The court noted: "[ilt seems hardly offensive to 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice'. . . to subject entities who do business in the United States and thereby
voluntarily bring themselves within the jurisdiction of our courts and legislature to the burdens
of United States law." Id. at 1389 n.6.
108. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1977). In this case a Federal grand jury investigating tax violations
of a foreign (Cayman Islands) bank subpoenaed the managing director of the bank. The direc-
tor refused to testify, claiming that his testimony would violate Cayman bank secrecy laws.
The court applied the Restatement balancing test and ruled that the interest of the United
States in assuring the efficiency of grand juries was superior to the banking secrecy concerns of
the Cayman Islands. In 1976 Florida was in the Fifth Circuit so this case has direct preceden.
tial impact on the Bank of Nova Scotia case.
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had had an active interest in the litigation.119 The court rejected this
argument and stated, "[a] careful reading of Field reveals that the fact
that Castle Bank and Trust Company was under investigation did not
affect the court's analysis.""'  Apparently, theBank of Nova Scotia court
assumed that a party's posture in a litigation is irrelevant since the Field
court did not specifically address that issue. In essence, the Bank of Nova
Scotia court held that since the issue was not discussed in the previous
decision it was obviously irrelevant to that analysis.
This reasoning is questionable as it is unsurprising that the Field
court did not comment on the posture of Castle Bank. In almost every
other case involving extraterritorial discovery jurisdiction the party
against whom the discovery order was imposed had an actual interest in
the litigation.11 Since the bank under investigation in Field clearly had
an interest in the matter, and since its posture was similar to that of
previous parties protesting discovery orders, evaluation of that position
was irrelevant. The effect of a party's posture on this type of analysis
only becomes important when the posture of the protesting party is sig-
nificantly different from previous cases. Such was the situation in Bank
of Nova Scotia. The Eleventh Circuit, however, summarily discounted
this important distinction.
Instead, the Bank of Nova Scotia court applied the standard extra-
territorial discovery jurisdiction test. 2 Initially, it noted that the bank
had not met the Societe Internationale requirement of a good faith at-
tempt at compliance. It then noted that since compliance might subject
the bank to foreign penal sanctions, respective interests must be balanced
under the Restatement test.I 3 The court, without discussing the issue of
hardship to the bank, perfunctorily concluded that the United States in-
terest was superior to the Bahamian interest. The court affirmatively
cited the Field decision: "In Field the vital role of a grand jury's investi-
gative function. . . outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest in protect-
ing the right of privacy incorporated into its bank secrecy laws."114
Accordingly, the district court contempt order was affirmed.
109. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1390.
110. Id.
111. The only four circuit cases involving a neutral party subject to extraterritorial discov-
ery were all Second Circuit cases. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. The most recent
of these was in 1968.
112. In effect the court analyzed the discovery order as if the Bank of Nova Scotia were a
litigant possessing a substantial interest in the litigation. The standard two-part test discussed
supra in the text accompanying notes 23-70 was utilized.
113. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1389.
114. Id. at 1391.
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B. United States v. First National Bank of Chicago1 '
The Internal Revenue Service, during an investigation of a bank cus-
tomer, served a summons on the First National Bank of Chicago (Bank
of Chicago) seeking disclosure of certain bank records at the bank's
branch in Athens, Greece. The bank declined to comply, alleging that to
do so would subject its Greek employees to criminal liability. 116 The
district court granted enforcement of the summons and ordered the bank
to comply with the discovery request because the bank failed to timely
respond to an order to show cause.1 17
In a situation similar to Bank of Nova Scotia,'11 Bank of Chicago
did not have an interest in the litigation as either a litigant or as a party
under investigation. The bank was a disinterested third party involved
solely because its customer kept an account with its Athens branch and
that customer was under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service.
This fact was accorded significant weight by the Seventh Circuit in its
extraterritorial discovery analysis. This recognition of the bank's neutral
posture contrasts sharply with the methodology of the Eleventh Circuit
in Bank of Nova Scotia."9
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the Restatement test.
The interest of the United States in collecting taxes and maintaining its
financial integrity was balanced against the Greek interest in preserving
banking secrecy. 20 Largely because identification of the funds in the
Athens account was of lesser significance when compared to the cus-
tomer's entire tax liability, the respective national interests were essen-
tially deemed equivalent. 21
The next step was an examination of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the bank. This factor was em-
phasized as a primary concern because of the noninvolvement of the
bank in the Internal Revenue investigation. The court noted that the
Greek bank employees who would actually make the disclosure would be
subject to criminal sanctions.' 22 There was considerable hesitation about
subjecting these individuals to liability. The court stated: "We think it
significant in weighing the hardship factor that the Bank employees who
115. United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
116. See id. at 344 n.2 for the pertinent sections.
117. Id. at 342.
118. 691 F.2d 1384.
119. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
120. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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would be exposed to penalty and First Chicago, which would be ordering
its Greek employees to act unlawfully, are involved only as neutral
sources of information and not as taxpayers or adverse parties in
litigation." 123
With this incorporation of concern about the bank's neutrality into
the Restatement test, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the inequity
of holding a party fortuitously drawn into a litigation or investigation to
the same standards as an actual participant with a stake in the matter. In
short, the Seventh Circuit concluded that fundamental fairness requires
inclusion in the evaluation process of the actual interest of the party
served with a discovery order. The inclusion of this factor in the analysis
is in harmony with previous cases involving third party extraterritorial
discovery.124
As a result of this determination, the matter was remanded to the
district court for inquiry into whether Bank of Chicago had made a good
faith effort to produce the requested information. 2 5 Even though the
action only involved enforcement of the summons, the circuit court
would not order compliance. Thus, the Seventh Circuit in this decision
has utilized the standard analysis of Societe Internationale coupled with
the Restatement test. The significant change in the utilization of this
two-part test is the incorporation and emphasis on the actual interest of
the party in question.
C. Comparison of the Two Cases
Obvious differences exist between these two decisions. The Seventh
Circuit is inclined to examine the fundamental fairness of subjecting a
neutral party to foreign legal sanctions. While the decision in the Bank
of Chicago case was not predicated entirely on the bank's neutral posture,
the noninvolvement was at least considered significant in the context of
the Restatement test. Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
disinterested status of the Bank of Nova Scotia was not important when
evaluating the validity of an extraterritorial discovery order.
This difference is highlighted by the fact that the Bank of Chicago
only faced an order enforcing an IRS summons, while the Bank of Nova
Scotia was charged with contempt. Courts using the Societe Internatio-
nale - Restatement analysis to determine whether to enforce a discovery
123. Id.
124. See, eg., Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
125. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346.
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order usually do enforce the order. 126 In contrast, courts are more cir-
cumspect when a party faces a contempt charge and a lighter burden is
imposed on the party refusing production. 127 Thus, it is significant that
the Seventh Circuit, which evaluated Bank of Chicago's neutral position,
did not enforce the summons, while the Eleventh Circuit, which did not
consider Bank of Nova Scotia's neutral position significant, upheld the
contempt order.
Another distinction concerns the severity of the respective nondis-
closure laws. In Bank of Chicago the bank was constrained by a Greek
statute which forbade disclosure even with customer consent. 128 In con-
trast, the Bahamian Bank Regulation Act 129 in Bank of Nova Scotia al-
lowed disclosure with express or implied consent of the customer and
additionally contained several broad exceptions permitting disclosure ab-
sent permission. The severity of the Greek statute was an important fac-
tor in the Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the summons against the
bank. 3' Similarly, the laxity of the Bahamian statute significantly influ-
enced the Bank of Nova Scotia decision. The Eleventh Circuit stated,
"[i]t is incongruous to suggest that a United States Court afford greater
protection to the customer's right of privacy than would a Bahamian
court simply because this is a foreign tribunal." 1 31
A difference also exists between the respective national interests in
conflict. In both cases, the foreign concern was the assurance of banking
secrecy. The concern of the United States in Bank of Nova Scotia was
insuring the efficacious operation of a grand jury conducting a criminal
investigation.132  In Bank of Chicago the interest was more benign and
involved accurate tax collection. Thus the Eleventh Circuit was balanc-
ing an arguably more important United States interest than was the Sev-
enth Circuit.
These differences notwithstanding, it is apparent that the circum-
stances of the two cases are similar. 133 It is also apparent that all factors
126. See supra note 36.
127. Id.
128. "[Bank employees] cannot be questioned on the secret deposits, even though the de-
positor consents." 699 F.2d at 344 n.2.
129. Bah. Acts No. 64.
130. The issue was remanded to the lower court to examine Bank of Chicago's good faith
attempts at securing disclosure under the one narrow statutory exception. Bank of Chicago,
699 F.2d at 346.
131. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1391.
132. Id. at 1387. It should be noted that grand jury records are usually not open to public
scrutiny. Thus, even though the Bahamian bank secrecy statute would be violated by testi-
mony to the grand jury, the extent of the disclosure would be limited.
133. Despite the similar postures of the two banks, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Bank
[Vol. 7
Extraterritorial Discovery
of the two-part analysis are equally important. A court faced with an
extraterritorial discovery issue must carefully weigh and examine each
factor individually and as a component part before reaching a decision.
The fundamental fairness of including in this analysis the actual interest
of the party facing potentially conflicting adjudications is manifest. A
party involuntarily drawn into a litigation is more sympathetic than a
party with an actual interest in seeking judicial resolution. The latter, as
a litigant, expects that it will be subject to discovery processes. Unfortu-
nately, the Eleventh Circuit has decided to ignore this important consid-
eration. This position clearly does not suggest sensitivity for
international comity.'
D. Probable Consequences of the Nova Scotia Decision
Potential ramifications of the Bank of Nova Scotia decision are pat-
ent. The ruling is particularly ominous given that it was made by the
Eleventh Circuit.'35 The southeastern states of this circuit are frequently
used as arrival and departure points to gain access to the Caribbean tax
havens.136 These countries which offer discreet financial services are pa-
tronized by numerous foreign and American entities attracted by the
convenient locations, confidentiality and minimal taxes.' 37 There has
been strong criticism that these foreign financial institutions are utilized
to conceal various activities, legal and illegal, detrimental to United
States interests.1 38  These activities particularly affect the collection of
tax revenues.1 39  One court, quoting the Congressional Record, noted:
"The debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on Ameri-
cans and the American economy are vast. It has been estimated that
of Nova Scotia on these differences. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 347. Also, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the Bank of Nova Scotia had not made a good faith effort to comply with
the subpoena whereas the question of Bank of Chicago's good faith was remanded. Id.
134. See Somportex, 453 F.2d 435.
135. The states comprising the Eleventh Circuit are Florida, Georgia and Alabama.
136. The Bank of Nova Scotia court noted that the Bank of Nova Scotia Miami branch
bank was essentially a one way conduit for customer communication with the Caribbean
branch banks. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384. The managing bank director in Field, 532
F.2d 404, was a foreign national served with the subpoena while in transit at the Miami
airport.
137. See W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD (1984). Of the ten
countries listed as "zero havens" (,. where taxation is essentially nonexistent), six are in the
Caribbean. The six are Anguilla, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Saint Vincent, and
Turks and Caicos Islands. Id. at lviii.
138. See H.R. 975, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1970), cited in Field, 532 F.2d at 409.
139. For a discussion on how tax haven laws operate to reduce an individual's United
States tax liability, see Chapoton Explains U.& Tax Haven Treaty Policy, 2 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 9946 (April 29, 1983).
19841
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
hundreds of millions in tax revenues have been lost."11 40
Notwithstanding a certain veracity in these criticisms, these institu-
tions are operating under laws enacted by independent sovereign states.
Consequently, the United States, under the doctrine of international
comity, 141 is required to accord a measure of respect to these foreign
states. The Eleventh Circuit, however, displayed scant concern with in-
ternational propriety by ignoring the neutral status of a bank required by
Bahamian law to refuse production. This attitude is disconcerting since
the action concerned a contempt charge involving potentially serious
repercussions. The fact that this circuit is likely to have jurisdiction in
most actions involving assets in Caribbean financial institutions is hardly
comforting to these institutions. The proximity of the circuit to the Car-
ibbean, coupled with its apparent inclination to order disclosure of
materials without regard to the party's involvement in the litigation,
could conceivably encourage the Internal Revenue Service and the Jus-
tice Department to bring actions in the circuit that might otherwise be
unsuccessful for lack of evidence.' 42
A recent Eleventh Circuit decision does not augur well for the rights
of foreign pities fortuitously drawn into an American legal action. In
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bowe,'43 a Bahamian at-
torney was subpoenaed by a Florida grand jury and ordered to produce
documents concerning his clients who were under investigation for al-
leged drug and tax violations. When he refused to produce the docu-
ments, arguing that disclosure violated Bahamian law regarding
attorney-client privilege, 144 he was charged with contempt. The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the contempt order without addressing Bowe's pos-
ture as a neutral "holder" of documents. In fact, the court did not utilize
the two-part Societe Internationale-Restatement est but instead held that
the factual similarty with the Bank of Nova Scotia decision was sufficient
to affirm the contempt order.'45
It is likely that international response to this recent extension of
140. See H.R. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970), cited in Field, 532 F.2d at 409.
141. Somportex, 453 F.2d 435.
142. The focus of the Reagan administration on this region of the United States is evident.
For instance, the Department of Justice has made South Flordia a target for enforcement of
drug trafficking laws, particularly those regarding marijuana smuggling. See Drug Enforce-
ment Policies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (Dec. 10, 1981) (testimony of Rudolph W. Giuliani, Associate Attor-
ney General).
143. 694 F.2d 1256 (11th Cir. 1982).
144. The Evidence Act of the Bahamas, 126, cited in Bowe, 694 F.2d at 1257. The statute
provides for a broader privilege than does its United States counterpart.
145. 694 F.2d at 1258.
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United States jurisdiction will include criticism and promulgation of
stricter laws designed to frustrate intrusive discovery.' 46 Previously,
when the judiciary extended its jurisdiction during numerous antitrust
investigations of foreign cartels, it received wide ranging criticism.1 47
The International Law Association 14 stated:
It is difficult to find any authority under international law for the
issuance of orders compelling the production of documents from
abroad. The documents are admittedly located in the territory of an-
other state. To assume jurisdiction over documents located abroad in
advance of a finding of effect upon commerce raises the greatest doubts
among non-Americans as to the validity of such orders. 149
In addition, numerous countries retaliated by enacting tough laws
that forbid any foreign discovery. 50 The district court in In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation'5 ' noted that Australian, Canadian and South Afri-
can statutes "were enacted or modified. .. for the express purpose of
frustrating the jurisdiction of the United States courts over the activities
of the alleged international uranium cartel."' 52 Even when the judiciary
attempted to reach uranium cartel documents through use of letters ro-
gatory, the English High Court refused to honor them because they con-
stituted an unwarranted extension of jurisdiction.'53 Obviously assertion
of United States jurisdiction can only be accomplished to the extent that
it is accepted by foreign nations.
Even the Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters'54 has not completely facilitated international dis-
146. This was the response by numerous nations during the United States antitrust investi-
gation of an alleged international uranium cartel. See, eg., Batista, supra note 20.
147. See REPORT OF THE 51sT CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 403-07, where numerous
foreign delegates criticized the intrusiveness of the American judiciary.
148. The International Law Association was founded in 1873 as "The Association for the
Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations." For a description of this organization, see
THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS - WRITTEN IN HONOR
OF THE CENTENARY CELEBRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 3 (M.BOS
ed. 1973).
149. REPORT OF THE 51ST CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 407.
150. See, eg., Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Anti.trust Lawsr The
British Reaction, 16 IN'L LAW. 313 (1982), for a discussion of the enactment of the Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act designed to inhibit foreign discovery.
151. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D.llU. 1979).
152. Id. at 1143.
153. Rio Tinto-Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434. For a discussion of this
decision see Sutherland, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation . Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Ex-
traterritorial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters, 5 MONASH U.L. Rav. 76 (1978).
154. Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, opened for signature Mar.
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1781) [hereinafter cited as
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covery. 155 A California appellate court 56 vacated a discovery request
served on a West German manufacturer (the United States and West
Germany both being treaty signatories), stating that "the initial discov-
ery order must appear to take into account the ascertainable require-
ments of the foreign state and to adopt those procedures which are least
likely to offend that state's sovereignty."' 157 The state court also en-
dorsed the federal "balancing approach" (i.e., the Societe Internationale-
Restatement test) despite the discovery procedures outlined in the Con-
vention. 58 United States discovery jurisdiction over entities domiciled
within signatory nations is an unresolved but apposite issue. The United
States Supreme Court recently attempted to address this issue, but ulti-
mately dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. 15 9
If the foreign actions in the uranium cases are indicative of future
events, the Caribbean tax haven nations are likely to enact tough preven-
tive statutes in response to the Eleventh Circuit's willingness to extend its
jurisdiction. In order to protect their lucrative financial business, these
small countries must act to guarantee the secrecy and anonymity of their
financial customers. Should this occur, the only recourse left would be
judicial reliance on tax treaties between the United States and the coun-
try in question. This method can be ineffective given the broad discretion
afforded each signatory,"6° however, and the Eleventh Circuit might be
advised to moderate its hard line stance. There are, however, indications
that the Bank of Nova Scotia decision may be achieving an end deemed
desirable by the United States despite the inflexible means. New banking
procedures for nonresident depositors have been instituted by the Bank
of Nova Scotia, and a Bahamian banking code of conduct (similar to the
Convention]. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (tenta-
tive draft No. 5).
155. Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention, supra note 154, allow a signatory party to refuse
discovery requests at its discretion. Further, none of the Caribbean "tax haven" nations have
signed the Convention. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781.
156. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840 (1981).
157. Id. at 858.
158. Id. at 857-58.
159. See Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Falzon, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1810 (1983), where the
Court granted a stay of a Michigan trial court decision which ordered discovery of extraterri-
torial information allegedly in violation of the Convention. The Court requested that the
United States Solicitor General file briefs in the matter, (104 S.Ct. 62 (1983)), but then dis-
missed the matter for lack of jurisdiction (104 S.Ct. 1260 (1984)).
160. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973-Dec. 23, 1975,
United States-Switzerland, art. 3, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 and Convention, supra
note 154, arts. 12 and 13. These articles allow a signatory party to refuse discovery requests at
its discretion.
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Swiss banking code) will soon be enacted. 161
The Bank of Nova Scotia162 decision represents the furthest limit to
which a federal court has extended discovery jurisdiction over a neutral
third party to a litigation. Evidently, any institution, no matter how for-
tuitously and tangentially involved in the litigation, will face conflicting
adjudications providing it has some contact with the United States. 63
Such a prospect undoubtedly causes concern among the Caribbean na-
tions whose economies are partially dependent on attracting foreign in-
vestors by offering a favorable financial climate.164 The Societe
Internationale-Restatement test purportedly provides a degree of objec-
tivity in the decision whether to assert jurisdiction. The Bank of Nova
Scotia court apparently nullified that assumption by indicating that the
interest of the United States in a criminal investigation is paramount to
another country's interest in providing financial privacy. In essence,
once a criminal investigation is begun, the court is capable of ordering
any extraterritorial discovery considered necessary. While this may be a
reasonable expectation upon the party under investigation, it is a major
leap in legal doctrine to apply the same standard to any entity dragged
into the case merely by chance. This decision would appear to many as
yet another example of United States disregard of the laws of other
nations.
A more equitable analysis is utilized in the Bank of Chicago6 case.
This decision reflects the concerns of the previous Second Circuit cases
involving extraterritorial discovery of third party documents. The Sev-
enth Circuit incorporated concern with the party's posture into the Re-
statement test. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit commented favorably
on the recently promulgated revised Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law.' 66 The pertinent sections of the revised Restatement 67
provide for a stricter examination of the equities involved in an analysis
of an extraterritorial discovery order than does the current Restatement
test. 168
This methodology insures that courts will accord proper weight to
161. Bad Trip, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1984, at 89.
162. 691 F.2d. 1384.
163. See id. at 1389 n.6.
164. See DIAMOND, supra note 137 for a list of potential nations that could face extraterri-
torial discovery conflicts and subsequent business losses as a result of this decision.
165. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341.
166. Id. at 346.
167. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LA\v § 403 (rent. Draft No. 2),
§§ 419, 420 (Tent. Draft No. 3) and § 483 (Tent. Draft No. 5).
168. See supra note 34.
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the involvement of the party in question, while concurrently assuring
that extraterritorial discovery requests directed at third parties will not
be automatically vacated. It is highly conceivable that situations will oc-
cur where, despite a party's neutrality, the balance tips to requiring the
production. When this occurs, however, the government whose laws are
circumvented may have some consolation in that all relevant factors were
considered. This approach is certainly more in accord with the funda-
mental philosophy of the doctrine of international comity than is the
Eleventh Circuit decision.
The Bank of Nova Scotia decision is a significant and unwarranted
extension of federal judicial jurisdiction. While the ultimate conclusion
to extend jurisdiction may have been proper, the court's arbitrary refusal
to consider the bank's neutral posture is insensitive at best. In contrast,
the Seventh Circuit's inclusion of that circumstance in its reasoning com-
ports to a much greater extent with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. In the interest of international goodwill, legislative or
executive action curbing the intrusiveness of the Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion might be advised. Given recent United States activities in the Carib-
bean, specifically Grenada,1 69 however, such action is unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
The American judiciary has developed an analysis whereby the equi-
ties involved in extraterritorial discovery are carefully evaluated. Early
decisions had established a precedent of judicial concern for the rights of
a neutral party when that party was subjected to a discovery order in
contravention of foreign statutes. 7° The Eleventh Circuit, in apparent
disagreement, held that the Bank of Nova Scotia was subject to sanctions
for its refusal to comply with a subpoena duces tecum despite its posture
of disinterested document custodian. The court deemed this noninvolve-
ment irrelevant.
Conversely, in a factually similar case involving the Bank of Chi-
cago, the Seventh Circuit considered the bank's disinterest in the litiga-
tion a significant concern in the extraterritorial analysis. The non-
involvement was an important factor in the court's evaluation of the
hardship imposed by subjecting the bank to potentially conflicting adju-
dications. This concern with the bank's neutral posture is in accord with
earlier cases and exemplifies the spirit of international comity and respect
169. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 1 and N.Y. Times, Oct 27, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
170. See supra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7
1984] Extraterritorial Discovery 621
for foreign sovereignty which is conspicuously lacking in the Eleventh
Circuit decision.
The Eleventh Circuit, in the interest of international goodwill, might
consider incorporating the methodology of the Seventh Circuit into fu-
ture decisions involving disinterested parties who are subject to discovery
orders which contravene foreign nondisclosure laws. Further, given past
foreign responses to the extension of United States jurisdiction, it is prob-
able that the Carribean nations potentially affected by the Bank of Nova
Scotia decision will enact nondisclosure statutes speciically designed to
frustrate United States discovery.

